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1 Introduction 
A largely neglected topic in the economics of development and globalization is the 
formation of elites and their mobility across nations. International migration is often 
considered in terms of skilled and unskilled people but rarely in terms of elites. 
Nevertheless, elites are important as carriers of knowledge, capital, contacts, ideas, 
creativity and leadership. 
 
The concept of elites was developed by the ‘Italian school’. Main representatives of this 
school were Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an economist and sociologist, and the 
political scientist Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941). On the other side of the Atlantic, the 
American sociologist C. Wright-Mills, in The Power Elite expanded the concept to 
include the economic, political, and military ‘power elite’ in the USA. Pareto (1991) 
viewed elites as ‘people with exceptional qualities’, thus holding a largely merit-
oriented concept of elites. Pareto then envisaged history as a circulation of elites mainly 
within nations; his main concern was not the international circulation of elites. In the 
Ruling Class, Mosca indicates that the main source of power for the ruling class (elites) 
is their superior internal organization, enabling them to ‘have a disproportionate 
influence over the vast majority of society despite their numerically small group’. 
Knowledge and organization are key elements for a group to become elite.  
 
Elites are individuals that have a capacity to save, invest, and generate knowledge, 
technology and creativity well above the average of the population. They also wield 
economic and political power. The international mobility of economic elites generates 
economic value and transfer investment, technology, new products and ideas across 
different countries. Political elites, in turn, shape the governance of society under which 
economic activities take place. The concept of elites conveys the idea of a small group 
of people that have an impact on society and the global and national economy that goes 
well beyond their quantitative number. The elites we refer to in this paper include 
people with special knowledge in the scientific and technological fields, professionals in 
the private and public sector, entrepreneurs with leading roles in innovation and 
technology transfer and politicians and social leaders. 
 
This paper is exploratory. It elaborates on a topic that we believe is important, how 
elites become transnational and why their mobility is bound to be important from the 
viewpoint of international development. It offers first a classification of different types 
of elites, distinguishing between knowledge elites, entrepreneurial elites, and political 
elites, examining the main features and particularities of each type of elite from the 
perspective of their international mobility. Then, the paper presents and discusses 
empirical evidence available on the mobility of people with high knowledge, creative 
power and entrepreneurial capabilities while discussing some suggestive evidence on 
mobility of politicians, still a largely unexplored field of analysis. We analyze the 
possible impact of each type of elites on economic development highlighting relevant 
channels such as knowledge generation, patents, enterprise creation, scientific 
knowledge, books, and works of art. We present and review several indicators that 
provide preliminary evidence for studying the impact of the activity of the elites, how 
they mobilize and concentrate across countries. The paper closes with some concluding 
remarks and directions for further research.  
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2  Concept and types of elites 
In this paper we concentrate on three types of elites: knowledge, entrepreneurial, and 
political elites. These elites are not necessarily the kind of elites associated with ‘power 
elites’ (Wright-Mills [1956] 2000) or ‘special or superior’ persons in the sense of Mosca 
(1960)1 though the concepts are not entirely unrelated. In fact, possessing knowledge, 
capital or political contacts give those who own these resources or attributes, ‘power’. 
The knowledge and entrepreneurial elites we are considering include professionals, 
scientists, medical doctors, graduate students, cultural workers and entrepreneurs. We 
consider also political elites in this paper, highlighting their different nature from 
knowledge-based and entrepreneurial elites.  
 
Although these elites may overlap with each other, the economics and sociology 
implied in the formation and patterns of mobility, both nationally and internationally, 
are different; these complex processes deserve attention and study. Their differences 
cover a broad range of distinctive dimensions such as the way they join foreign labour 
markets, as well as salary levels, career paths, promotion criteria, and so forth. In the 
case of entrepreneurs their access to product markets, capital markets and other services 
markets is relevant.  
2.1 Knowledge  elites 
A main asset in today’s world is knowledge. People that generate, disseminate and 
apply knowledge have a special advantage. When we talk about knowledge elites we 
assume the main linking force among these individuals is the high talent and knowledge 
that these people carry with them. These elites involve a range of individuals: those who 
generate scientific knowledge, people who apply scientific and technological knowledge 
to production, innovation, business, academia, and people engaged in valuable social 
and cultural activities. Globalization enables the spread, across countries, of new 
information technologies, new products, services, and ideas. The occupations of 
knowledge elites include independent professionals and experts, academics, scientists 
and scholars in university and research centers, executives and managers working in 
multinational corporations and professional staff of public international organizations. 
The international dimension of knowledge elites relates to the spreading of ideas, 
knowledge, and technology across countries. The development of knowledge elites 
takes place both in source countries through education at home and abroad 
(international students, professionals and through international exchange), and in the 
receiving countries that support the education and development of foreign talented 
people and collaborate with origin countries to repatriate them. The circulation of talent 
helps to mobilize knowledge, ideas, and technological innovation and directly impacts 
economic activity in source and receiving nations.  
 
Roles and impact of knowledge elites  
Solimano (2008) distinguishes four types of ‘talent’ that are internationally mobile. 
These types of talent are closely related to knowledge elites:  
 
                                                 
1  Also Pareto ([1968] 1991) pointed out that elites comprise ‘people with exceptional qualities,’ or 
those considered almost ‘superior members of society’.   3
1.  Directly productive technical and managerial talent: this category includes people 
in positions in the production process such as executives, managers, and technical 
engineers who are important engines of production processes. Their productive 
contributions range from overseeing production, managing people, changing 
organizational structures and strategies, developing new business lines, machinery 
enhancement, etc. Their contribution towards development and economic growth 
can be measured by changes in market shares of their respective companies, 
changes in labour- or capital-intensity in productive processes, and by the outcomes 
of the managerial models they are applying. 
 
2.  Scientific talent: this group – comprising academics, scientists, international 
students, and researchers – helps to create and spread knowledge and their 
contributions take place primarily in universities and research centers. Perhaps this 
is the most studied group and its mobility has been analyzed for many years starting 
with the concept of ‘brain drain’, and gradually changing to ‘brain circulation’.  
 
3.  Health talent: this is a wide group of people consisting of physicians, surgeons, 
dentists, therapists, and mental health professionals. It also includes nurses, 
pharmacists, clinical scientists, and paramedics. The consequences of its 
international mobility may be detrimental for the health sector of the origin country, 
mainly when health professionals come from low to middle income nations. Part of 
the health mobility, however, has gained scene worldwide thanks to altruistic or 
international programmes such as World Health Organization, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières – Doctors without Borders, 
Project HOPE, Oxfam International, and many others. 
 
4.  Cultural and social talent: includes artists, musicians, writers, media-related 
people, free-thinkers, social entrepreneurs, and other social-change promoters,2 
who help to spread cultural products and social values around the world. 
These four categories may have different motivations for moving internationally. 
Managers and technical people tend to move within-companies (intra-firm employee 
transfers) or across companies in different countries. International wage differentials 
and compensation schemes are important drivers of executives’ mobility. Scientists are 
more interested in moving to countries that offer larger budgets for doing research, more 
possibilities to publish and higher salaries. Health sector professionals react to 
professional and ethical challenges, wage differentials and career possibilities and 
cultural talent also look at the possibilities for greater recognition and interaction with 
peers abroad.  
 
  
                                                 
2  As an example of social entrepreneurs and well-being promoters we recall Dr Muhammad Yunus, the 
banker and economist from Bangladesh, founder of the Grameen Bank and developer of the concept 
of micro-credit. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2006 due to ‘efforts to create economic and 
social development from below. Lasting peace cannot be achieved unless large population groups find 
ways in which to break out of poverty. Micro-credit is one such means. Development from below also 
serves to advance democracy and human rights.’ (The Norwegian Nobel Committee, Oslo, 13 October 
2006).   4
2.2 Entrepreneurial  elites 
 
Entrepreneurial elites are people with special skills in wealth creation, resource 
mobilization and innovation. Entrepreneurs are not necessarily endowed with formal 
university education and this feature differentiates them from the knowledge elites. The 
role of the entrepreneur is the organization of production and the surge of innovation. 
They are critical agents of the growth and development process. They engage in the 
development of new businesses and organizations and, most of the time, carry with 
them a flow of capital and new technologies. Still the distinction between the 
knowledge and entrepreneurial elites is not as sharp: for example managers and 
technicians contribute critically to business creation which is the role of the 
entrepreneurial elites. In that sense there are complementarities between knowledge and 
entrepreneurial elites.  
 
Although the idea of entrepreneurship is an ancient one, defining and limiting its scope 
is still complex. In economic theory, entrepreneurs have the distinctive feature of taking 
risks – a point emphasized by Frank Knight and Joseph Schumpeter – and show a talent 
for combining the capital and labour necessary to realize a vision of opportunity and 
prospective profits. In the Schumpeterian tradition, entrepreneurs are agents for 
mobilizing resources and investment and promoting innovation. In addition, the 
‘psychology’ of the entrepreneur certainly differs from that of the scientist, the expert, 
or the intellectual with whom we usually associate the term ‘human capital’ and here we 
ascribe them to knowledge elites. In contrast, professionals, scientists, and engineers are 
often employees rather than owners and are supposed to be more risk-averse than 
entrepreneurs (Solimano 2010). 
 
The emphasis on the role of entrepreneurship in the literature of growth economics in 
recent years has been generalized and the term is applied to a wide variety of 
phenomena.3 Here we adopt an empirical definition of entrepreneurship developed by 
Ahmad and Seymour (2008), that unifies various aspects and evolution of the idea of 
entrepreneurship (Avanzini 2008). For these authors the entrepreneur is an economic 
agent who ‘is simultaneously looking back to the resources (and combining them in new 
and creative ways) and forward to markets (and perceiving new or unmet opportunities). 
The entrepreneur creates value by recognizing the fit between the two. The 
entrepreneur’s activities occur within a business context, which includes industry 
structures, competition, and national economic structures. This business context is 
impacted in turn by wider environmental considerations, which include the economic, 
political, legal, social, cultural, and natural settings.  
 
Using this definition entrepreneurs are naturally talented people, in a way that is not 
necessarily derived from formal education, but rather they possess a business vision that 
lets them take advantage of the rising opportunities dealing with existent resources or 
generating new ones. It is also clear that this type of entrepreneurship is an economic 
one or for profit. Another category is that of social entrepreneurs (included before 
within merited and talented elites) whose motivations may be altruistic and tied to social 
commitment; of course the actions and influences of social entrepreneurs also have an 
economic and social impact. 
                                                 
3  Some authors, such as Gartner (2001), pose the necessity for establishing unified criteria about the 
meaning and extent of entrepreneurship.   5
 
Entrepreneurs – with or without formal higher education – who engage in new 
businesses, produce knowledge, are innovative, and move around the world to develop 
their ideas constitute the mobile entrepreneurial elite. For developing countries, the 
arrival of these entrepreneurs implies a change in established paradigms: they introduce 
new technologies, knowledge, and change market perspectives; sometimes they bring 
capital with them to develop activities contributing to generate wealth, employment, and 
enhance productivity. 
 
Opportunity seeking and capital mobilization by entrepreneurial elites 
The literature of entrepreneurship developed in the last 30 years or so has introduced the 
following distinction: 
•  Entrepreneurs of opportunity. This is based on the notion of ‘opportunity 
seeking’ individuals4 who perceive business opportunities and have the 
capacity to mobilize resources (credit, people, technology) for seizing those 
opportunities. These cases are usually identified as ‘opportunity 
entrepreneurship’. 
 
•  Entrepreneurs of necessity. In this case individuals get involved in 
entrepreneurial activities due to the lack of alternative economic opportunities. 
Generally, they are people who are currently unemployed, or their last job was 
not satisfactory, so they engage in new enterprise creation to generate income 
and meet their needs. This entrepreneurial activity is sometimes called 
‘necessity entrepreneurship’.5 This is typically the case of shop-owners, small 
workshops, micro-enterprises and so on.  
In fact, we can characterize entrepreneurial activity by (i) the nature of the 
entrepreneurial opportunities,6 (ii) the entrepreneurial characteristics of the individuals,7 
and (iii) the distinctive features of the decision-making environment8 in which the 
entrepreneurial phenomenon takes place. The three characteristics endow 
entrepreneurship with particular features that also determine its economic impact, 
duration, and likelihood of international mobility. Despite the differences involved in 
the previous classification, entrepreneurship may smoothly range from opportunity to 
necessity, and both motivations are present to a certain degree in different types of 
entrepreneurs (Avanzini 2007). Internationally mobile entrepreneurs appear to be more 
‘opportunistic’ in the sense of their search for new business opportunities and the 
capacity to gather resources for seizing those opportunities. These internationally 
                                                 
4  See Gaglio and Katz (2001), and Baron (2004). 
5  See McClelland (1961), Collins and Moore (1964), and Busenitz and Barney (1997).  
6  See Kirzner (1979), Shane and Venkataraman (2000), Gaglio and Katz (2001), among others. 
7  This feature is studied by McClelland (1961) Collins and Moore (1964), Busenitz and Barney (1997), 
to name a few. 
8  This characteristic has been introduced more recently in the entrepreneurship theory by Knight (2001), 
Alvarez and Barney (2005), among others.   6
mobile entrepreneurs may be of a different size9 and operate in various sectors. The 
emergence of ‘technological entrepreneurs’ that connect markets in different countries 
and regions such as say Silicon Valley in the USA with Bangalore in India or with Israel 
is a case at hand.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between entrepreneurship and levels of economic 
development (a sort of inverted Kuznets curve for entrepreneurship). It shows the 
relationship between the Total Entrepreneurship Activity rate (TEA), collected by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM 2006) and the level GDP per capita (PPP 
adjusted) as a proxy of development levels. The U-shaped form of this relationship has 
been explained by both types of entrepreneurship: while high-income countries, such as 
USA, Japan and EU countries show a positive relationship between entrepreneurial 
activity and income level (reddish-shaded area), low- and middle-income countries 
present a negative relationship between the two variables (light blue-shaded area). The 
positive slope can be interpreted as showing the relevance of opportunity 
entrepreneurship which is more frequent at higher per capita income levels and 
associated with the development of new markets, products, and the exploration of new 
economic activities that often imply important capital mobilization to support 
investment. On the other hand, the portion of the curve with a negative slope would 
correspond to necessity entrepreneurship, in low and middle income countries involving 
underemployed and unemployed people trying to meet their daily needs through small 
scale entrepreneurial activities. This entrepreneurship is often associated with lower 
capital requirements and tends to be more volatile, with a high rate of entrepreneurial 
exit. Some empirical evidence shows that new businesses started in countries in the light 
blue-shaded area – e.g. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Peru, and Thailand, among 
others – are more likely to exit market activity before the 42 months.10 
 
This figure suggests the international mobility of entrepreneurs is related to the desire of 
entrepreneurs to find, in other nations, wider markets, more access to funding and 
technology and lower costs of doing business. This directly influences the international 
location of entrepreneurial activity. Thus, it seems plausible that, opportunity 
entrepreneurs constitute a group with a higher probability to move internationally. Some 
examples arise from the super-rich (Forbes’ ranked billionaires). For example, the 
Walton family of the Wal-Mart markets chain, the Benetton family with the design and 
production of clothes, the MacMillan family in the agricultural field (Cargill), John de 
Mol and Joop van den Ende with their entertainment business, among many others. 
Most of them are engaged in the development of new businesses around the world in an 
international scale, mobilizing capital and human resources (something that affects also 
talent mobility) in order to exploit market opportunities in receiving countries.  
 
Technology entrepreneurs engaged in start-ups eventually reach the stage of 
internationalization of their business, a critical step for the international mobility of 
entrepreneurs. Very often, these entrepreneurs maintain connections with their home 
countries and become a vehicle of development in their home countries if they bring 
                                                 
9   Here, ‘size’ refers to economic size, in the sense of the entrepreneurs’ capacity to mobilize capital 
stocks. 
10 Time limit to consider a new business as an established one, as defined in GEM (2006).   7
capital, technologies and forge business connections with external markets.11 The 
literature on international mobility of entrepreneurs highlights a key distinctive feature 
of these elite: their capacity to mobilize capital and technology across national borders, 
channeling capital obtained in the receiving country to support their entrepreneurial 
business in home countries or in other nations.12 
 
On the other hand, necessity entrepreneurs who responsed to economic stress, 
recessions and slumps,13 are less likely to move abroad as they have fewer international 
connections and lower economic resources to finance mobility that is costly (transport 
costs, cost of job search, or business opportunity search). Still the issue needs further 
research as hardship and necessity is often a motivation of international migration of 
people.  
 
There is a degree of international mobility of small size (necessity) entrepreneurs 
provided by immigrants that open small businesses in the host countries; this is typically 
the case of ethnic stores, cultural goods, and remittances shops, carpets stores that are 
owned and run by foreigners.  
2.3 Political  elites 
A third category is the political elite. These elites include party leaders, congressman, 
heads of state, presidents and leaders of social movements with ties to political parties. 
These political and social leaders often have broad social network connections with 
their power based in their home countries.14 Up to a certain point, this is related to the 
concept of the ‘power elite’ (Wright-Mills [1956] 2000 and Mosca 1960). Political 
elites largely impact governance through enabling (or failing to enable) the achievement 
of political consensus. They shape the political environment and institutions of society, 
which are critical elements of stability and respect for property rights that affect 
investment and innovation. On the other hand, failed political elites who are unable to 
produce an acceptable degree of political stability and social peace or that generate an 
excessive level of rent-seeking and corruption may delay economic development. 
                                                 
11 Recent research has emphasized the role of these returning and circulating talented-entrepreneurial 
elites as an engine of economic growth and attractor of foreign investment. Saxenian (2006a) studies 
the effects of these elites in Taiwan and Israel. Saxenian (2006b and 2008) studies the effect of the 
adoption of the Silicon Valley model in China and India, on a case-by-case basis. On a more 
aggregated basis, Docquier and Lodigiani (2008) study the impact of skilled migration and their 
networks outside sending countries on foreign direct investment inflows in sending countries, finding 
important positive network externalities, namely that having a large educated diaspora abroad 
stimulates physical capital accumulation. 
12 New businesses boosted by arriving entrepreneurs may destroy weak economic sectors or absorb 
incipient local entrepreneurs, exploiting scale economies, or dominating markets due to capital 
availability. Also entrepreneurs may generate economic instability because of their quick entry/exit 
behaviour (generally associated with the so-called ‘flying’ capital). 
13 They try to overcome the difficult times with small businesses (rarely developing grand new strategies 
and products or big projects) and tend to disappear as soon as they get a stable job in the labour 
market. 
14 Modern bureaucratic society values these organizational skills and rewards them with political power. 
Political elites use several mechanisms to support and improve their net, such, as social connections, 
marriage, and ownership of productive assets, ideas and beliefs, political clientelism, ‘favour’ 
exchange, etc. 
   8
 
A question related to the main theme of this paper is the extent to which political elites 
are internationally mobile. Empirical evidence is scant on this issue, the conventional 
wisdom is that political elites are country-specific and do not have special traits that 
make them internationally mobile. Political leaders are often viewed as tied to political 
circumstances and social conditions of their home country. However, we also can 
observe groups of people that belong to transnational political networks (i.e. the 
international social democrat, the international Christian democrat, conservative 
internationals and so on). In other words, the internationalization of politics is related to 
the fact that certain ideologies such as liberalism, communism, social-democracy, and 
others that inspire social movements and political parties are international. The party 
leadership that manages these connections could be considered to be part of 
international political elite. Another source of international mobility of politicians is 
related to violent political change such as civil wars, coup de etats that force exile and 
emigration of the political leadership associated with defeated factions.   
3 Empirical  evidence   
One of the weaknesses of the study of the international mobility of elites is the lack of 
information about their characteristics, patterns of behaviour, and their development 
impact. In this section we present preliminary empirical evidence that provides clues 
about the impact and features of elite mobility that we hope can be useful in further 
research on this emerging topic.  
3.1  The geographical concentration of knowledge elites in rich countries 
Measuring the concentration of elites in certain locations and countries is important to 
gauge the extent to which the mobility of elites reduce or widen development gaps 
across nations and make international development a more uneven process. The 
evidence suggests that talent and knowledge are often concentrated geographically in 
rich nations. Solimano (2010) looks at various indicators of talent such as the country 
distribution of Nobel Prizes in Sciences and Economics and other categories of Nobel 
Prizes during recent decades, and concludes that these Nobel Prizes are concentrated in 
high income countries in the North, with a dominating concentration in the USA: almost 
63 per cent of the Nobel Prizes considered have been awarded to researchers and 
scientists who did their work in the USA, of which 23 per cent correspond to foreign 
born individuals that obtained the prize for their contributions during their stay in the 
USA. The UK and Germany hold 8.26 per cent of the Nobel prizes; and the others are 
almost equally distributed between other developing countries. See Table 1 for details 
on the geographical distribution of Nobel Prizes awarded to scientific and medical 
talent.  
In the cultural field, artists, writers and painters benefit from interaction with peers and 
seek a milieu supportive of their creativity. In the first decades of the twentieth century 
important foreign painters (Picasso, Matta, Modigliani and others) and writers 
(Hemmingway, Stein, and Fitzgerald) concentrated in Paris. More recently García 
Márquez, Isabel Allende and others found support for their literary and artistic careers 
largely outside their home countries. In Table 2, we illustrate the distribution of the 
Nobel Prize in Literature for the period 1980-2008. These are uniformly awarded across 
countries in contrast to the prizes in science and economics that are strongly biased   9
towards advanced economies. Some of the Nobel laureates of literature were awarded 
due to their capacity to express – in highly creative ways – the particular situations in 
their home countries. 
There have been other attempts to describe the mobility of talent such as Florida’s 
(2005) ‘Global Creativity Index’, which uses creativity as a proxy for talent. The Global 
Creativity Index ranges between 0 and 1, and is a weighted average of other three 
indexes: talent, technology, and tolerance. Table 3 presents the values of the index and 
shows that the potential for creativity in high-income countries is higher than in middle 
income and low income countries. In rich countries there are more resources for 
creativity, since there is a greater critical mass of peers, and living and working 
environments tend to be more supportive of creative people. In this sense, the flow of 
talented people to developed countries and their concentration in certain geographical 
locations is supported by the evidence about the spillovers. At the same time, they form 
clusters of knowledge development linked by common interests despite their origins. 
Another attempt to quantify a talent index is that of Heidrick and Struggles (2007) and 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), presented in Table 4. This index identifies 
concentration of talent in certain countries (or regions) and infers patterns of 
international mobility. The Global Talent Index uses quantitative and qualitative data to 
measure the economic indicators, cultural contexts, trends in education, foreign direct 
investment, mortality, health and market flexibility that will impact the ability of talent 
to thrive in a set of 30 countries included in their study. Developed countries have the 
highest scores while less developed countries score lower. The level of per capita 
income is a key explanation variable for the concentration of talented people and 
knowledge elites in rich countries. In contrast, political instability and the absence of 
democracy tend to motivate emigration of the knowledge elites from unstable countries. 
As before, stable, prosperous and rich countries tend to be more attractive as places of 
destination for knowledge elites.  
There are several reasons for explaining the concentration of scientific and health elites 
in high income countries. Besides higher pay and better working conditions – certainly 
very important factors – there are the synergies emerging from the concentration itself: 
the gains from interaction with colleagues in a suitable environment helps to foster 
intellectual production. The high level of intellectual production in high income 
countries is reflected in the number of scientific publications that we collect in Table 5 
for the period 1998-2003. As can be expected, top-rated countries coincide with those 
with a greater number of awarded Nobel Prizes, giving us a hint about the importance of 
the interaction between talented people, and how attractive a country may be for 
circulating knowledge elites. 
The relative abundance of talented people in the North (high-income OECD countries), 
serves to attract even more talent to those nations. Synergy and better economic 
conditions, combined with a culture that recognizes and rewards talent and historical 
ties with source countries, are important factors that foreign students value in choosing a 
country to pursue their higher-education. Vincent-Lancrin (2008) studied this group of 
mobile talented elites as part of the World Migration Report 2008 prepared by the 
OECD, and found that there exists a general trend for educated elites to move from 
Southern to Northern countries, and the choice of country of destination is heavily 
influenced by the factors listed above including the existing concentration of talent (a 
stock) that acts as a magnet for immigrant talent (a flow). Table 6 shows the flows of   10
international students from different regions to OECD countries. In this context, we can 
see that, for example, historical links between Africa and Europe make the latter the 
preferred destiny of African students going abroad. Commercial links between North 
America and Asia turns the former in the destiny of choice for Asian students. Political 
and commercial ties direct South American students flow to North America. 
Geographical proximity and commercial links strengthen the connections between 
Oceania and Asia-Pacific. 
Scientists, researchers, and health professionals tend to collaborate and produce 
knowledge across universities. According to Jones et al. (2008), the tendency to produce 
knowledge through team-work increasingly crosses disciplinary boundaries, not only in 
science but also in engineering and the social sciences. Multi-university research teams 
are the fastest growing type of authorship structure during the last three decades. In this 
context, elite universities, generally located in developed countries, play a dominant role 
in a new trend, given that research papers produce their highest-impact when they 
include a top-tier university. Elite universities are more interdependent, with a higher-
impact and increasingly visible role in science, engineering and social sciences. The 
differential role and impact of elite and non-elite universities is widening. These authors 
conclude that despite the rising frequency of research that crosses university boundaries, 
the intensification of social stratification (by in-group university rank) in multi-
university collaborations suggests a concentration of the production of scientific 
knowledge in fewer centers of high-impact science. 
These results also extend to technical and directly productive knowledge generation, as 
pointed out by Wuchty et al. (2007). The authors find a similar tendency among 
technically talented people who collaborate in the production of directly productive 
inventions. In Table 7 we present some statistics on the distribution of patents registered 
by residents and non-residents for selected countries for the period 1998-2004. High 
income countries dominate the ranking, with Japan and the USA accounting for 57 per 
cent of patents registered around the world. However, notice the differential basis of 
patent registration: Japan, Germany, the Russian Federation, and France have a 
predominant registration of patents by residents, associated with home country 
production of knowledge, while countries such as Canada, China, and Australia have an 
increasing sharing of non-resident patent registration, indicating that those countries are 
more likely to be the receivers and adopters of new technologies. 
We also get an idea of the extent of mobility and concentration of executive and 
managerial talent by looking at intra-company transferees across borders. Table 8 uses 
data from the OECD’s World Migration Report 2008 to show evidence of this. 
According to the table, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela have been 
important contributors of executives, managers, and specialized professionals working 
at transnational enterprises for the USA. In this context, Chile has gained relevance in 
the share of highly qualified employees being moved outward. This is another example 
of talent circulation that is rarely accounted for in usual statistics (which often only 
include students and academics). Many companies move their people from their offices 
in peripheral countries to their headquarters in USA, Japan, Germany, France, or the 
UK, ‘draining’ local managerial and technical talent, attracting them with job 
promotions and better economic conditions and also better education opportunities for 
their children (executive packages for executives that move abroad often include 
benefits for children to pursue studies in the receiving country).   11
Also the availability of a suitable and stable economic and political environment, 
together with enough funding and infrastructure increase a country’s attractiveness for 
knowledge and entrepreneurial elites who need to support their work. A usual measure 
of funding available for knowledge creation and application is the level of research and 
development expenditure, as shown in Table 9. OECD countries plus Israel more than 
double in average the R&D expenditure in less developed countries. However, the 
implications of this empirical fact are more worrying: recently, Grossmann and 
Stadelmann (2008) developed a model of the impact of the mobility of high-skilled 
people on R&D and infrastructure investment. They found that when emigration of 
talented people increases (brain drain), public spending in R&D and infrastructure 
investment in sending nations is reduced. Receiving economies, on the other hand, tend 
to increase its investment in R&D and infrastructure with the immigration of talent.  
For many years there has been a persistent belief that emigration of highly-skilled 
people damages developing countries and favours developed countries (brain drain from 
the global south to the north). The general picture can be seen in Figure 2: Latin 
America and Africa have been a source of talent that has been migrating to OECD 
countries. Major destinations for talent coming from developing countries during the 
last quarter of twentieth century have been Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia, France, 
and Germany. Also Figure 3 shows a similar situation in the case of health 
professionals, indicating that during the 14 years represented in the chart, Africa, South 
Asia, the Middle-East and Latin America have been exporting health talent to the North. 
Receiving countries in the OECD have gradually introduced selective immigration 
policies designed to facilitate the entrance of highly-qualified people while the 
immigration of less qualified individuals is more difficult. According to the ILO (2006), 
many developed countries seem to be competing to attract global talent in order to 
strengthen their international position in the ‘global war on talent’. On the supply-side, 
instability in origin countries, poor opportunities for intellectual development, global 
tendencies to agglomerate capital and human resources where they are abundant, and 
positive self-selection among international migrants, have also contributed to direct 
flows to northern countries in detriment of less developed countries in the south. 
3.2  Circulation of entrepreneurial elites  
During recent years, researchers have realized that ‘brain drain’, contrary to generalized 
beliefs, might also generate some positive spillover for sending countries. This 
introduced a more nuanced view to the brain drain phenomenon. Beine et al. (2008) 
emphasize the effect of high-skilled migration on gross human capital formation, 
showing that this brain drain may be beneficial in some situations. According to their 
findings, high-skilled migration prospects can raise the expected return to human capital 
and foster higher investment in education in sending countries.15  
                                                 
15 They derive two main conclusions: ‘First, brain drain migration contributes to an increase in the 
number of skilled workers living in the developing countries. This suggests that the traditionally 
pessimistic view of the brain drain has no empirical justification at an aggregate level. Second, the 
brain drain has important distributional effects among developing countries, […]’ (Beine et al. 2008: 
648, italics as in the original). Their findings are supported by the empirical fact that countries 
combining relatively low levels of human capital and low skilled emigration rates are more likely to 
experience a beneficial brain drain, i.e. a net positive effect, and conversely. This phenomenon also 
produces the distributional outcome these authors refer to: small countries such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa and Central America are less able to take advantage of the brain drain so they are net   12
 
Saxenian (2006a, 2006b, 2007), uses case studies of Israel, Taiwan, India, and China, to 
argue that the circulation of entrepreneurial and technological elites has beneficial 
impacts on sending countries. She shows that people, who have developed their careers 
abroad, may constitute an important source of growth in their respective home 
countries. This is because they return home, or use new technological devices and lower 
transport costs permit collaboration in real time, even on complex tasks, with 
counterparts located at great distances. Also the migration of talented students to 
developed countries to continue their high education may be viewed as something 
prejudicial for sending countries if they stay abroad afterwards, but new evidence shows 
that those emigrants are returning to their home countries, carrying with them 
knowledge, technology, and capital. 
 
In Taiwan and Israel, Saxenian (2006a) focuses on the dissemination of the Silicon 
Valley model. According to her findings, the spread of venture capital financing has 
helped returning immigrants – those that once were young students ‘drained’ out of 
their home countries – to transfer the Silicon Valley model of early-stage high-risk 
investing to Taiwan and Israel, locations that USA venture capitalists typically had 
neither interest in nor ability to serve. Native-born investors promoted this capital 
arrival providing the cultural and linguistic know-how needed to operate in these 
markets, bringing technical and operating experience, knowledge of new business 
models, and networks of contacts in the USA. She highlights the fact that when foreign-
educated venture capitalists invest in their home countries they transfer first-hand 
knowledge of the financial institutions of the new economy to peripheral regions.  
 
However, this reverse-migration process does not work everywhere in the same way. 
Saxenian argues that although developing countries that invested heavily in education in 
the postwar period also suffered the most from ‘brain drain’, when their most successful 
students left home to take advantage of educational and economic opportunities in 
wealthier and more advanced economies – not all countries are prepared to take 
advantage of the benefits of reversed migration and entrepreneurial elites action. Some 
developing economies in Africa and Latin America have failed to invest in higher 
education (particularly technical education) and have no suitable labour force to engage 
domestic economies in such entrepreneurial activity. Others – e.g. Iran and the Russian 
Federation – have been too politically unstable to attract large numbers of technically 
skilled returnees. Still others, like Singapore and Scotland, have sufficient skill but have 
oriented domestic institutions – including capital markets, regulatory, educational and 
research institutions, labour markets, and so forth – toward attracting foreign investment 
rather than supporting indigenous entrepreneurship. In many Asian countries, 
government support for large scale, capital intensive investments in the 1970s and 
1980s, either by domestic corporations (Korea) or by multinationals (Singapore), had 
created relatively inhospitable environments for entrepreneurial experimentation. 
 
Recently, a new measure of entrepreneurship – developed in Avanzini (2009) – supports 
these conclusions offering key empirical information to understand the changing 
attractiveness of countries for entrepreneurs. In this context, entrepreneurship is 
measured by means of a composite indicator that includes seven aspects of 
                                                                                                                                               
losers in this context, while big developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil seem to obtain 
non-negligible gains due to the brain drain.   13
entrepreneurial activity, its environment and impact, namely entrepreneurial activity 
(including firm dynamics, firm survival, and ownership); entrepreneurship spirit, 
culture, and initiative; barriers to entrepreneurial activity and business environment; 
knowledge procurement; innovation; impact on employment; and impact on economic 
activity. The attractiveness of a country is measured by the relevant aspects it may offer 
to entrepreneurs, and these aspects evolve through time changing entrepreneurs’ 
location decisions in order to take advantage of the opportunities. Table 10 shows the 
relevance of each aspect for two periods, 1998-2001 and 2002-2005, and the rank of a 
set of selected countries.  
Some countries, such as the USA, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland have 
traditionally been considered suitable places for hosting entrepreneurial activities. 
However, other countries like Israel, China, Brazil, Mexico, and India, have made major 
efforts in recent years to make themselves more attractive to entrepreneurs. The 
fostering and quality improvement of higher-education (particularly, technical 
education), and the investment in infrastructure, technology, and telecommunications, 
helped to shape a more comfortable environment to install new enterprises, much of 
them being outsourcers of big transnational companies. Also some changes to the law 
and bureaucratic procedures have reduced administrative barriers to entry and 
diminishing cost of doing business, both being relevant factors to encourage new 
productive activities. Other developing countries such as Argentina and the Russian 
Federation are making efforts to become more attractive to international mobile 
investors though economic and political instability in these countries threaten their 
possibilities.16 
3.3 International  mobility of political elites 
For many years, the general belief has been that political elite are less mobile than 
others due to the fact that their constituencies are home-based and provide the support to 
maintain their power basis at home. However, there is some evidence that point to a 
degree of international mobility of the political elite. We can identify the following 
channels for this mobility: (a) individuals who later became national leaders in their 
home countries originally had left their home countries to follow their higher-education 
in foreign universities (b) part of the political class becomes mobile across national 
boundaries by assuming posts of international representation and diplomacy (c) political 
leaders that are members of international networks (social-democrats, liberals, 
socialists, communists) move internationally as part of their political work (d) violent 
political change such as coups de etat, civil war, internal conflict, a turn to authoritarian 
politics in the home-countries force or compel political leaders to move to other nations.  
 
The empirical evidence around these four categories is still scant. A piece of evidence 
on political leaders who have studied abroad earlier and come into prominence in their 
home country (our channel a) is provided by Spilimbergo (2007, Table 10). According 
                                                 
16 As pointed out by Saxenian (2007), today’s returning entrepreneurs have accelerated the adaptation of 
technology and institutions to local circumstances, transferring production to a new environment, 
contributing with their knowledge of the local context, and bridging the differences in social, cultural, 
and institutional settings. Production division and specialization, reduction in the cost of 
transportation, and the rapid improvement of communication allow these highly mobile entrepreneurs 
to build and maintain long distance partnerships to tap overseas expertise, cost savings, and markets.   14
to his findings, more than half of the political leaders who had relevant positions in their 
countries of origin in the 1990s chose to study abroad, and the preferred destinies were 
the USA, the UK, France, and Russia. As explained by Spilimbergo, and in connection 
with the previous discussion on student mobility, the existence of former political and 
historical connections between countries of origin and destination (e.g. colonies) helped 
to explain those choices by international students. Political leaders also tend to move to 
places where exists previous political, cultural, idiosyncratic, and historical links 
between the sending and the destination country.17  
 
Historical examples related to our channel (d) would be the exile of the government of 
the Spanish Republic, led by Manuel Azaña, after the Republicans lost the civil war in 
1939; the self-exile and hiding of many Nazi leaders after the end of the Second World 
War (several of them ended up in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay); the exile of 
Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz in 1956 after a USA-led coup d’état; the exile in 
Spain of Argentinean leader Juan Domingo Peron in 1955 until his return to Argentina 
in early 1973 and several other examples.  
4 Concluding  remarks   
This paper is exploratory and deals with a largely under-researched topic: the 
international mobility of elites. The topic is complex on many levels starting by the very 
definition of elites, and the nature of their development effects. The literature has 
highlighted the issue of brain drain but nowadays we face more complex patterns of 
brain and talent circulation that suggest that sending countries may also benefit from the 
international mobility of knowledge and entrepreneurial elites. In addition, political 
elites are, to some extent, also internationally mobile although for different reasons than 
those guiding the mobility of economic elites. 
 
A suggestive classification we adopt in this paper is that of knowledge, entrepreneurial 
and political elites. Knowledge elites are heterogeneous and composed by high level 
managers and executives, scientists and academics, people in the health sector and 
cultural activities. In general their main comparative edge lies in the possession of 
specific knowledge and talent that is privately and socially useful for scientific, 
technological and commercial purposes. Globalization and the increased 
interconnection among countries greatly increase the economic value of this talent and 
its international mobility. The international mobility of entrepreneurs is somewhat 
different. Entrepreneurs move across national boundaries because of more attractive 
business opportunities, less red tape and bureaucracy, more credit to fund business and 
larger markets are found in other countries than at home. In the paper we use the 
distinction between entrepreneurs by opportunity and entrepreneurs by necessity with 
the former being probably more internationally mobile than the latter. Still in many 
recipient countries there is also a flourishing segment of foreign small size 
entrepreneurs in the services sectors such as restaurants, commerce and others. Return 
migration and circulation of technological entrepreneurs is a new feature that connects 
economies and regions in ways not considered years ago.  
                                                 
17 In this context, it is not strange that people coming from Eastern Europe during the social period chose 
the Soviet Union as a place to study. In turn, students from former colonies in Africa prefer UK and 
France to follow their education.   15
 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this paper shows a high concentration of 
professionals, scientists and innovators in high income countries reinforcing 
development gaps in the global economy as valuable human capital move from low and 
middle income countries to rich nations. However, new patterns of mobility of talent, 
capital and technology have emerged in which sending countries may also benefit (the 
typical case of technological entrepreneurs that emigrated from India, Taiwan, Israel to 
the USA or Europe and play a connecting role transferring technologies, know-how and 
market contacts to emerging economies).  
 
The international mobility of politicians which is little investigated in the literature, is a 
new topic that we consider in this paper. We identify the forced mobility of politicians 
and social leaders after losing their positions following violent political change in their 
home countries. In these cases, political leaders may choose to live abroad, often in 
exile. We also find some empirical evidence showing that political leaders in 
developing countries often obtain education in universities in Europe and North 
America in their youth, and this education proves to be a source of international 
contacts useful for their future political careers at home. In addition, some degree of 
intra-developing countries mobility in the educational field exists for future politicians 
and civil servants.  
 
Topics for future research emerging from this paper include a better understanding of 
the determinants of entrepreneurial migration by size, motivation and degree of 
technological sophistication. Also we need to know more about the patterns of 
international talent mobility within the private sector (i.e. multinational corporations) 
compared with the mobility of independent professionals and entrepreneurs. Also more 
research is needed on the patterns of international mobility of people within the 
international public sector including both the technocracy of international organizations 
and political representatives in those organizations. More research is needed for 
understanding the international mobility of social leaders and politicians, too. Research 
in all these topics would benefit from joint work and professional dialogue between 
economists, sociologists and political scientists. Moreover, better and more statistical 
data and qualitative analysis would certainly help in advance our understanding of the 
determinants of the international mobility of elites. 
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Table 1: Prizes to talent: Nobel Laureates in Science and Economics (1980–2008) 
 
Source: Updated from Solimano (2009) based on data available at http://nobelprize.org. 
 
 
Table 2: Prizes to talent: Nobel Prizes in Literature (1980–2008) 
 
 
Source: Solimano (2010) based on data available at http://nobelprize.org. 
 
  




United Kingdom (immigrants)  3 Ireland 1 
United Kingdom 2 Italy 1 
South Africa  2 Japan 1 
Austria  1 Mexico 1 
Colombia  1 Nigeria 1 
Czechoslovakia 1 Poland 1 
Egypt  1 Poland & USA 1 
Hungary 1 Portugal 1 
France  2 Saint Lucia 1 
France (immigrant)  1 Turkey 1 
Germany  1 USA 1 
Spain  1 USA (immigrants) 1 
 
Countries Physics Chemistry Medicine Economics  Total (w/o 
literature)
USA 32 27 31 27 117
USA (immigrants) 9 11 8 73 5
United Kingdom 0 4 8 41 6
United Kingdom (immigrants) 0 1 2 14
Germany  64511 6
Germany (immigrants) 4 0 0 04
F r a n c e 22318
J a p a n 34108
Sweden 1 0 4 05
S w i t z e r l a n d 22105
Canada 2 1 0 14
The Netherlands 3 1 0 04
Other Countries 5 4 4 31 6
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Table 3: Distribution of talented elites: global creativity Index, 2005 
 
 













1 Sweden 0.808 0.642 0.819 0.964
2 Japan 0.766 0.702 0.785 0.811
3 Finland 0.684 0.728 0.626 0.698
4 United States 0.666 0.601 0.827 0.571
5 Switzerland 0.637 0.541 0.625 0.744
6 Denmark 0.613 0.597 0.385 0.858
7 Iceland 0.612 0.658 0.463 0.717
8 The Netherlands 0.611 0.643 0.366 0.824
9N o r w a y 0.595 0.686 0.279 0.819
10 Germany 0.577 0.468 0.511 0.753
Developing and Transition Economies
25 Russian Federation 0.339 0.521 0.112 0.385
27 Ukraine 0.296 0.404 0.103 0.38
33 Uruguay 0.24 0.22 0.021 0.478
36 China 0.23 0.031 0.109 0.55
38 Argentina 0.199 0.193 0.045 0.357
40 Chile 0.185 0.16 0.055 0.339
41 India 0.177 0.085 0.137 0.309
42 Mexico 0.164 0.15 0.043 0.299
43 Brazil 0.159 0.128 0.083 0.266
45 Romania 0.127 0.131 0.035 0.214
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Table 4: Distribution of talented elites: global talent Index, 2007 
 
 







1  United States 52
2  Canada  47
3  The Netherlands 46
4  United Kingdom 46
5  Sweden 45
6  Germany 43
7  Australia 43
8  China  42
9  France 41
10  India  39
8  China  42
10  India  39
17  Argentina 34
18  Russia  33
19  Ukraine  33
21  Mexico 31
23  Brazil  30
24  South Africa 29
25  Egypt  29
27  Nigeria  25
Developing and Transition Economies
Top 10 Countries  22
Table 5: Scientific and technical production: journal articles, researchers and technicians 
(average 1998-2003)  
 
 








Researchers in R&D 
(per mill. people)
Technicians in R&D 
(per mill. people)
Top Ten Countries
United States 200,088 4,556 --
Japan 56,463 5,188 595
United Kingdom 47,931 2,706 --
Germany 43,456 3,134 1,372
France 31,347 2,930 --
Canada 23,178 3,451 709
Italy 21,917 1,168 1,347
China 20,320 537 --
Russian Federation 16,785 3,400 565
Spain 15,281 1,841 663
Other Selected Countries
India 11,015 119 102
Korea, Rep. 10,229 2,594 510
Brazil 6,814 344 332
Finland 4,915 6,915 3,297
Mexico 3,126 240 97
New Zealand 2,947 3,222 744
Argentina 2,870 706 308
Singapore 2,387 3,920 359
South Africa 2,332 307 73
Chile 1,185 419 298
By Region 
European Monetary Union 146,841 2,461 1,224
Europe & Central Asia 40,022 2,027 385
East Asia & Pacific  22,041 490 --
Latin America & Caribbean 15,491 -- --
South Asia 11,600 119 102
Middle East & North Africa 4,048 -- --
Sub-Saharan Africa 3,770 -- --
World  645,188 -- --
By Income
High income 548,216 3,667 --
High income: OECD  529,218 3,695 --
High income: nonOECD  18,999 -- --
Low & middle income 96,972 -- --
Middle income  83,802 714 --
Upper middle income  46,057 1,360 318
Lower middle income  37,745 490 --
Low income  13,170 -- --  23
Table 6: Destinations of foreign students studying in OECD countries by origin (2004) 
 
 
Source: Vincent-Lancrin (2008), Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 7: Applied talent: patent applications (average 1998-2004). 
 

























Japan  417,760 32.61 50,952 12.20 3.98 366,808 87.80 28.64
United States  308,420 24.08 141,917 46.01 11.08 166,503 53.99 13.00
Korea, Rep.  116,711 9.11 41,708 35.74 3.26 75,003 64.26 5.86
China 87,052 6.80 51,786 59.49 4.04 35,267 40.51 2.75
Germany 59,484 4.64 10,897 18.32 0.85 48,587 81.68 3.79
Canada 37,921 2.96 33,937 89.49 2.65 3,985 10.51 0.31
United Kingdom  31,326 2.45 10,897 34.79 0.85 20,429 65.21 1.59
Russian Federation 31,056 2.42 8,751 28.18 0.68 22,305 71.82 1.74
Australia 28,582 2.23 20,401 71.38 1.59 8,182 28.62 0.64
France  17,025 1.33 3,386 19.89 0.26 13,639 80.11 1.06
Other Selected Countries
Brazil  17,010 1.33 13,813 81.20 1.08 3,197 18.80 0.25
India  10,597 0.83 6,434 60.71 0.50 4,163 39.29 0.32
Mexico 10,318 0.81 9,841 95.38 0.77 477 4.62 0.04
Israel  9,266 0.72 7,701 83.11 0.60 1,565 16.89 0.12
Singapore  8,699 0.68 8,217 94.47 0.64 481 5.53 0.04
Argentina  5,602 0.44 4,772 85.19 0.37 830 14.81 0.06
Indonesia  3,682 0.29 3,466 94.14 0.27 216 5.86 0.02
Chile  2,966 0.23 2,744 92.50 0.21 223 7.50 0.02
Netherlands 2,844 0.22 534 18.77 0.04 2,310 81.23 0.18
Finland  2,554 0.20 260 10.20 0.02 2,293 89.80 0.18
By Income
High income  1,075,408 83.95 348,972 32.45 27.24 726,436 67.55 56.71
High income: OECD  1,048,070 81.82 323,886 30.90 25.28 724,184 69.10 56.53
High income: nonOECD 27,339 2.13 25,086 91.76 1.96 2,252 8.24 0.18
Low & middle income 205,543 16.05 121,514 59.12 9.49 84,028 40.88 6.56
Middle income 193,221 15.08 114,328 59.17 8.93 78,893 40.83 6.16
Upper middle income 67,258 5.25 38,274 56.91 2.99 28,984 43.09 2.26
Lower middle income 125,963 9.83 76,054 60.38 5.94 49,909 39.62 3.90
Low income 12,322 0.96 7,187 58.32 0.56 5,135 41.68 0.40
World 1,280,951 100.00 470,487 36.73 36.73 810,464 63.27 63.27
Patent Applications, Total Patent Applications, Nonresidents Patent Applications, Residents
Country / Country Group 
North America Europe Asia-Pacific OECD 
Africa  20%  77% 3% 100%
North America 44%  43% 13% 100%
South America 56%  41% 2% 100%
Asia  40%  32% 28% 100%
Europe  16%  81% 3% 100%
Oceania  27%  19% 54% 100%
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Table 8: Intra-company transferees from South America to the United States (1996-2002) 
 
Source: OECD (2004). 
 
Table 9: Government Expenditure in Research & Development (average 1998-2004) 
 









% of GDP 
(1998-2004)
Top Ten Investors in R&D World 2.17
Israel 4.42
Sweden 3.85 By Region
Finland 3.34 European Monetary Union 1.90
Japan 3.04 East Asia & Pacific 0.99
Iceland  2.76 Europe & Central Asia  0.83
United States 2.68 South Asia 0.70
Switzerland  2.57 Latin America & Caribbean  0.57
Germany  2.48 Middle East & North Africa  N/A
Korea, Rep.  2.46 Sub-Saharan Africa N/A
Denmark  2.35
By Income
Other Selected Countries  High income 2.42
France 2.20 High income: OECD 2.43
United Kingdom  1.87 High income: nonOECD N/A
Russian Federation 1.12
China  1.08 Low & middle income  0.70
Brazil  0.97
India  0.79 Middle income 0.74
South Africa 0.76 Upper middle income 0.68
Chile 0.57 Lower middle income 0.77
Argentina  0.42
Mexico 0.39 Low income 0.70
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002
Argentina 1,524 2,580 3,764 6,628
Bolivia 42 69 88 173 
Brazil 4,175 5,831 8,470 9,562
Chile 590 1,131 1,562 2,096
Colombia 1,128 1,929 4,729 7,692
Ecuador 211 255 496 886 
Guyana 17 25 50 82 
Paraguay 34 64 90 59 
Peru 393 496 929 1,392
Uruguay 139 160 318 537 
Venezuela (RB) 2,179 2,775 4,495 7,963
South America 12,428 17,313 26,991 39,072
As % of Total 7.4% 7.5% 8.5% 11.8%  25











1. Entrepreneurial Activity  10.27 1. Entrepreneurial Activity 6.01
2. Employment 13.29 2. Employment 22.01
3. Economic Activity 9.00 3. Economic Activity 13.21
6. Knowledge Procurement 13.28 6. Knowledge Procurement 15.86
7. Innovation  33.61 7. Innovation 27.44
Total 100.00 Total 100.00
Ranking Country  Index Ranking Country Index
Top ten countries Top ten countries
1  United States 1.1863 1 China 1.1502
2  Switzerland 0.7991 2 United States 1.1075
3  Japan 0.7424 3 Indonesia 1.0372
4  Sweden 0.7317 4 Korea, Rep. 0.4491
5  China 0.6296 5 Japan 0.2922
6  Finland 0.5787 6 Finland 0.2584
7  Germany 0.4533 7 Brazil 0.2314
8  Australia  0.3864 8 Mexico 0.1970
9  Korea, Rep. 0.3720 9 Switzerland 0.1790
10 Canada 0.3370 10 Israel 0.1567
Other selected countries Other selected countries
19 Brazil 0.0477 11 Canada 0.1473
21 New Zealand 0.0144 12 Argentina 0.1380
24 Argentina  ‐0.0062 13 Australia 0.1099
26 Chile ‐0.0157 17 Sweden 0.0700
27 Israel ‐0.0182 19 Russian Federation 0.0643
28 India ‐0.0232 20 India 0.0226
29 Mexico ‐0.0246 21 New Zealand 0.0194
34 Singapore  ‐0.0543 56 Singapore ‐0.1744
44 Indonesia ‐0.1170 61 Germany ‐0.2329
49 Russian Federation ‐0.1317 64 Chile ‐0.2423
Importance of dimensions           %I m p o r t a n c e  of dimensions           % 










15.74 3.05  26






























































































Figure 2: High-skilled migration rates for six selected OECD countries (1975-2000) 
 
Panel A: Immigration 
 
Panel B: Emigration 
 
Source: Defoort (2006), Tables 2 and 3 (country list available in its Annex). 
Note: The High-Skilled Immigration Rate corresponds to the proportion of High-Skilled 
Immigration Stock in Total Immigration for each country. The High-Skilled Emigration Rate is 
defined as the ratio of the number of high-skilled emigrants aged 25+ to the six major receiving 
countries in Panel A to the total number of skilled natives aged 25+ (residents + emigrants). 
High-Skilled workers are those with a post-secondary certificate. Data for 1975 required many 
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Figure 3: Medical talent emigration rate per region, 1991-2004 
 
 
Source: Docquier and Bhargava (2007), Figure 1 and accompanying dataset. 
Note: MENA stands for Middle-East and Northern African Countries. Countries included in each 
group are described in the same paper. 
 
 